Autopoiesis, language, literacy and the brain by Graham, Philip W.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Graham, Philip W. (1999) Autopoiesis, language, literacy and the brain.
Fine Print, 22(2), pp. 3-7.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/43764/
c© Copyright 1999 Victorian Adult Literacy and Basic Education
Council
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Autopoiesis, language, literacy, and the brain 
Introduction 
When we attempt to speak about the relationship between language, literacy, 
and the brain, we find ourselves ill-equipped to deal with these conceptually and 
qualitatively different phenomena. Immediately we must straddle different academic 
traditions that treat each of these as separate “things”. Broadly speaking, the study of 
language firstly belongs to the domain of biology, then to anthropology, sociology, 
and linguistics. At its most functional, a study of literacy education is a study of a 
particular technology, its diffusion techniques, and the abilities and motivations of 
people to adopt, or adapt themselves to, this technology. The brain is most commonly 
studied in the field of neurology, which is also a sub-discipline of biology, 
biochemistry, and medicine.  
By highlighting disciplinary divisions between the three phenomena under 
investigation, I wish to show the paradoxical and perhaps impenetrable relationship 
between language and thought – most often attributed to the proper functioning of the 
brain – and the primarily technological relationship between language and literacy. 
The argument I briefly present here is that the way we have come to understand and 
describe literacies of various sorts, especially the ability to read and write, gives us a 
distorted view of language and the brain – and, perhaps, even of ourselves as learning, 
languaging creatures.  
Some problems with cognitivism 
Language, literacy, and the brain most certainly have a lot to do with each 
other. Pinker’s (1994) account of cognitive linguistics is an exemplar of the 
cognitivist approach to reconciling the relationships between these phenomena. The 
prevailing attitude of cognitive linguistics, which imagines the brain to be the 
generative “source” of language and meaning, ignores some fundamental aspects of 
the human organism, its cognitive processes, and the role that social embeddedness 
plays in constituting the environment in which the social processes of language and 
cognition take place. Pinker (1994, 1997), describes the brain as a computational 
mechanism. Its functionality is assessed in terms of its ability to calculate and 
represent the world; to encode and decode reality; and it its ability to effectively give 
“instructions” to the rest of the body.  
The intractable difficulties of accepting the cognitivists’ argument can be 
explained quite quickly. Firstly, if the brain were a machine that decoded and encoded 
the world for its “user”, then language that describes concepts could not properly 
exist. This is because abstract concepts (for instance, “equality”) cannot be separated 
from the language used to describe them, whereas pork chops, for instance, can. Next, 
we must impute some tricky, basically mechanical connections: if thought and 
language are separate “things”, and the brain is the mechanism that somehow connects 
them, then we must say where language, thought, and the brain “end” in terms of their 
functionality (not to mention the reductionist project of deducing the functions of 
ever-smaller parts of the brain). Then we must infer the nature of these mechanisms. 
Finally, if we do deduce some mechanisms that connect these three theoretically 
discrete elements, then we must account for self-reflexivity: the “mind”. This last 
conceptual barrier is best explained in the form of a gedanken experiment devised by 
Restak (1995: 88-9).  
Imagine that you are neuroradiologist who has the ability and technology to 
perform a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) test on your own brain. You could 
move your body and simultaneously see where corresponding brain activity occurred. 
Then you could talk, or merely decide to think about something, again watching the 
MRI for activity. Immediately, self-reflexivity becomes a problem. This is because the 
issue arises as to the relationship between your intention to perform movements, 
words, and thoughts for the purpose of seeing what effects occur within your own 
brain according to the MRI output. In other words, your intention to move, speak, or 
think must either be taken into account as part of the test results, or you must assume 
that your ‘mind is directing the operation of your brain’ (Restak 1995: 89). Descartes’ 
ghost suddenly looms large in the MRI machine’s output. Suddenly the body, 
including the brain, is a mere appendage which the mind directs. 
The ‘teeny weeny people’ solution 
Never fearful of tackling the most complex questions on the simplest terms, 
Pinker (1997) elaborates a technologically updated metaphor of the ancient 
homunculus solution to conscious experience. The homunculus theory imagines a 
Russian doll arrangement of sentient little people, each inside the head of the one 
larger, each of which directs “traffic” inside the brain of the larger homunculus. 
Pinker, apparently armed with the knowledge that flatter management systems are the 
order of the day, describes the latest version of the homunculus solution. He calls it, 
charmingly, ‘the production system’: 
A production system contains a memory and a set of reflexes, sometimes called 
“demons” because they are simple, self-contained entities that sit around waiting to 
spring into action. The memory is like a bulletin board on which notices are posted. 
Each demon is a knee-jerk reflex that waits for a particular notice on the board and 
responds by posting a notice of its own. The demons collectively constitute a 
program. As they are triggered by notices on the memory board and post notices of 
their own, in turn triggering other demons, and so on, the information in the memory 
changes and eventually contains the correct output for a given input. Some demons 
are connected to sense organs and are triggered by information in the world rather 
than information in memory (1997: 69). 
Descartes’ God is substituted by Pinker’s system of demons. It is as if, for 
Pinker, the mind were situated somewhere other than “in the world”. And questions 
about the ‘demons’, with their ‘notice board’ system of mutually triggering, ever-
patient, sentient sticky notes, bear little conceptual scrutiny without resorting to 
numerous metaphysical assumptions. The homunculus theory has never really gone 
out of fashion in mainstream thought, especially not since Descartes, Newton, and the 
Enlightenment got together to provide a more “rational” approach to understanding 
the universe, our machines, and ourselves as egg-in-cup reflections of one another. 
But one should not be too harsh on Pinker and the cognitivist school. Such 
technophilically derived explanations are to be expected. Since recorded history, and 
even more noticeably since the Enlightenment, the way in which we have described 
ourselves as thinking, acting beings most often bears an uncanny resemblance to our 
most advanced technologies, which includes our institutionalised conceptions of God 
(cf. Innis 1951). This is not surprising if we consider the role of technologies, 
especially communication technologies, which are humanity’s primary means of 
socio-environmental control (Innis 1951).  
Literacy as a technology 
Increasing numbers of our technologies, which can be defined as abilities to 
control elements of our physical and social environments, are described as literacies. 
Without going into a full literature review on the subject, one can easily find 
references to “financial literacy”, “cultural literacy”, “political literacy”, and, most 
importantly these days, “technological literacy” (eg Bigum & Green 1993).  
If we look at the history of our technologies, and particularly our 
communication technologies, we see a number of interesting patterns corresponding to 
the way we describe ourselves in terms of what we are, or at least of how we operate 
(cf. Innis 1950). Just as Newton’s clockwork universe ratified Descartes’ view of the 
body as a machine inhabited by an ethereal mind, the historical trajectory of 
communication technologies, from orality and print to the widespread use of the 
telegraph, radio, television, and finally the personal computer (PC), has ratified views 
of the world as something that can be encoded and stored in memory, collective or 
otherwise. But this is to confuse the map with the territory. Language, at least from an 
autopoietic perspective, is neither a code (although it can be encoded) nor a 
technology (although it can be technologised). Language is, rather, both a human 
behaviour and an environment.   
Autopoiesis: a brief introduction to the biology of cognition  
The significance of an autopoietic perspective for language and literacy lies in 
Maturana and Varela’s (1980, 1987) assertion that the presence of cognitive processes 
within a system is both necessary and sufficient to classify the system as living. In 
other words, the basic criteria of a living system is that it has the ability to distinguish 
between itself and its environment (Maturana 1978: 36; Maturana & Varela 1980: 96). 
Such a system is also necessarily autopoietic, which means, literally, self-making. To 
discover how knowledge is produced in autopoietic systems, the unit of analysis 
becomes the whole organism, and we must ‘discover “regions” that interweave in 
complex manners, and, in the case of humans, that extend beyond the strict confines 
of the body into the socio-linguistic register’ (Varela 1992: 14). Maturana’s 
perspective on the role of language in human society is even more forthright than 
Varela’s: ‘language defines humanity’ (Maturana 1988).  
Language differs from linguistic behaviour, such as that displayed by birds, 
apes, or dolphins. Linguistic behaviours are behaviours that coordinate other 
communicative and social behaviours. Language is possible only because humans can 
interact with their own descriptions of the world, which necessarily include those of 
their own internal states. Consequently, language and self-consciousness are 
concomitant with each other: 
[A] living system capable of being an observer can interact with those [observations] 
of its own descriptive states which are linguistic descriptions of itself. By doing so it 
generates the domain of self-linguistic descriptions within which it [the system] is an 
observer of itself as an observer, a process which can be necessarily repeated in an 
endless manner. We call this the domain of self-observation and we consider that 
self-conscious behaviour is self-observing behaviour, that is, behaviour in the domain 
of self-observation. The observer … necessarily always remains in a descriptive 
domain, that is, in a … cognitive domain (Maturana & Varela 1980: 121).  
As humans, observers, and describers, our knowledge is a socially and 
technologically constrained phenomenal domain. To explain: we humans are born into 
an environment of language, and therefore knowledge –preconceived ways of ordering 
and relating the world. We are told, in language, how to encode language in socially 
conventional ways, thereby becoming literate. Literacy, from this perspective, is a 
socially acceptable level of fluency in a technology which is the means by which we 
produce, hoard, consume, and distribute meanings (distinctions, descriptions, 
cognitions, and re-cognitions) made in an environment of language. Of course, I have 
over-simplified literacy here to emphasise the difference between literacy, which is a 
technology, and language, which is a biological phenomenon that largely constitutes 
the socio-cognitive environments into which we are born. 
Language as an environment 
My purpose in describing language as an environment is to emphasise the 
social aspects, origins, and functions of language. Imagine, for a moment, that 
language systems are environments that are constituted as concretely as, for instance, a 
city. Imagine a person, newly arrived in this city, learning to navigate their way 
through their new environment. Without stretching the metaphor too far, we can 
imagine this individual eventually finding their way around the city; developing a 
taste for particular restaurants, shops, and shortcuts; finding suitable lodgings and an 
occupation; and, more often than not, settling into particular routines and locales that 
suit her or him. In turn, their participation in this environment changes the 
environment itself. 
Language is an environment into which we are born. Its Participants, 
Processes, and Circumstances create the framework for the socio-cognitive 
environments in which we move, mean, and understand (Graham, in press). The 
socially produced and reproduced environment of language pre-exists each of us, is 
embodied by us, and it allows us to exist in society as we do. Trying to separate 
language from thought, as Vygotsky (1986) recognised, leads to certain intractable 
difficulties which eventually boil down to a chicken and egg conundrum: one cannot 
conceivably exist without the other, at least not in any socially meaningful sense (it 
may be conceivable to some that a fish experiences thought, but we cannot know what 
it thinks). But, because we can so easily (at least for some) separate our language, and 
therefore our thoughts, from ourselves by using the technology of literacy, we are 
easily seduced into the idea that the creations (distinctions) we make in language 
actually exist as something objectively distinct from our socially embedded selves. 
Consequently,  
we live existing in our language as if language were a symbolic system for referring 
to entities of different kinds that exist independently from what we do, and we treat 
even ourselves as if we existed outside language as independent entities that use 
language (Maturana 1995).   
The cognitivist confusion which sees the brain’s operation reflected in the 
dreamland of gleaming digital technologies merely extends the confused perception 
that arises from thinking of language firstly as a code, merely because it can be 
technologically encoded. As the saying goes: “give a kid a hammer and the whole 
world becomes a nail”. 
What neurology has to say about the brain: “It’s broken …” 
Neurology, like cognitive linguistics, often describes the brain as ‘the 
preeminent information processor’ (Restak 1995: 124). When speaking about the 
brain, neurologists tend to express themselves in terms of abnormalities (1995: 74). 
From the point of our investigation, this immediately raises two paradoxes. First, the 
brain appears as an object spoken about in language, which the brain, at least from the 
cognitivist and neurological perspective, supposedly “controls”. Secondly, from the 
neurologists’ perspective, the brain has two states: normal or abnormal.  
Part of the reason for this is that specific brains usually only become of interest 
to neurology when they are damaged, or show signs of damage. To put it in the words 
of an eminent neurologist:  
Most of what we know about the brain has come from the meticulous examination of 
the effects of injury or illness. Typically a neurologist correlates what is observed 
about the affected patient during his [sic] illness with changes in the brain discovered 
during an autopsy examination (Restak 1995: 74).  
Neurology, then, believes that by understanding how a damaged or 
malfunctioning brain hinders the “normal” operation of other biological functions we 
can understand which bit of the brain controls which bit of the body. Of course, this 
presumes that the chicken and egg question is answered in the affirmative for 
Cartesianism: that is, that the brain dictates how the body operates and that the body is 
merely an appendage of the brain. With this approach to understanding the brain, 
neurology has also advanced its knowledge by such rigorous means as mutilating 
monkeys and other animals to see how brains change with physical damage:  
Just as the borders of a country change to reflect natural and human-produced 
changes, the brain alters itself on the basis of experience. In the monkey experiment 
the “brain map” was altered by the cruel act of cutting off one of the monkey’s 
fingers. Within the next several weeks the neurons formerly controlling that finger 
were incorporated into the brain areas representing one or more of the remaining 
fingers (Restak 1995: 93). 
The paradoxes inherent in seeing the brain as a Cartesian, ostensibly isolated 
element which processes information and controls the body again become apparent. 
Even while seeing direct evidence of the brain’s reliance on the conditions in which 
the body finds itself, the neurologist insists that the neurons formerly controlled the 
monkey’s former finger. It seems doubtless that the brain is intrinsic to the “normal” 
functioning of the whole body (whatever “normal” might mean in this context), but to 
assume that the relationship is one-way dictatorial on the part of the brain flies in the 
face of logic, and the evidence presented by the ghastly experiments that Restak 
describes (the monkey’s neuronal activity is checked by removing part of its skull and 
connecting electrodes to its exposed brain).  
Further difficulties become apparent when we draw an analogy based on the 
assumptions of mechanistic neurology. Assume, for a moment, that cars were a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, by which I mean not manufactured by people. Your 
job is to deduce how cars operate based on the symptoms of various types of 
mechanical failure. Your focus is engines, which are assumed to make cars go. You 
assume that all engines are “normal” and fairly homogenous until they break down. 
You have no comprehensive or definitive knowledge of how the engine is connected 
to the rest of the car, nor do you take into account that engines all develop differently 
and operate in different environmental conditions. If you try to remove the engine 
from the car, it stops going. Thus, the only engines you can examine are from cars that 
have ceased working altogether. Therefore, you can’t examine the structure and 
function of the engine at the same time.  
By taking this approach to mechanics (which I think is how my mechanic does 
it), you will, at best, develop a taxonomy of engine disorders corresponding with 
specific symptoms, the most common of which will appear to be self-evident, 
empirically derived truths. But none of these disorders will necessarily have anything 
to do with the structure or function of cars or engines. Using the approach I outline 
above, one could only describe cars in terms of the various malfunctions they suffer. 
Nor would such a taxonomy necessarily be of use in fixing the car, regardless of its 
condition. The taxonomy would only necessarily be coherent in terms of itself and the 
attributions of an ultimately abductive observation of disorders. 
I’ll leave behind neurological disorders now - many of which can cause 
learning “disorders” - and move on to the implications for literacy of what I have said 
so far. 
Technologising the environment of language   
Caveat emptor: I must confess, although I teach communication in a 
university, I do not consider myself to be an expert at teaching literacy. Therefore, 
anything I say about the subject should be treated with the suspicion that any 
unindoctrinated layperson ought to evoke among experts. Lack of expertise 
notwithstanding, my familiarity with the polemic between whole-language and 
phonics, formalism and functionalism, gives me the perspective of a reasonably well-
informed and very interested onlooker. Such arguments, in some instances, can be 
dismissed as ideological trench warfare wrought by a good deal of intellectual 
investment on the part of well-intentioned experts. Based on the perspective I have 
outlined above, I argue that multiple understandings of language, literacy, and the 
brain are quite necessary for successful education. Still, even with an understanding of 
context (environment) and phonemic literacy (a basic sub-technology of literacy), 
learners of literacy are left with a conceptual gap which can only be filled by a 
functional understanding of grammar.  
To explain this assertion, I will (forgive me) use another analogy. Literacy, as I 
have said, is a technology. Although, like all technologies, it contains language, it is 
not language. Let us again take the technology of cars as an analogy. If we wanted to 
teach people how to make their own car, we would need to teach them a number of 
things. First, they would need to be familiar with the qualities that cars can possess, 
and which contexts these qualities are suited to: do they want to build something like 
the latest German sports car, a vintage banger, a four-wheel drive, or an armoured 
personnel vehicle? By showing our student a range of cars with various qualities, we 
could give them some idea about the type of car they want to build. Next, our student 
needs to become familiar with the bits that go together to make a car: nuts and bolts, 
carburettors and camshafts, windshields and widgets. All that being done, we ought to 
be able to leave our student because they have everything they need: a knowledge of 
what makes a car “good”, a knowledge of what cars do, and knowledge of the bits that 
go together to make them up.  
Of course, we can’t leave our student there, not if we want to teach the 
capability to build, or even fix cars. Even though our student knows what sort of car 
she wants to build, and she knows which bits do what, she doesn’t know is how it all 
goes together: she doesn’t know the grammar of car construction. Without that 
knowledge, she is unlikely to build a complete car. We would not expect someone to 
become a competent mechanic without a comprehensive understanding of the 
relationships between the parts of a car – that is, how cars function as systems. It is 
even less likely that our student would become competent in fixing or building cars 
with specific qualities for specific purposes without a knowledge of the mechanics of 
excellence; in literary terms, a knowledge of genre and functional grammar. No 
homogenous or doctrinaire formalisms would do in either case, neither in car 
mechanics nor literacy. 
Conclusion 
My argument here is underpinned by more-than-mild alarm at the levels of 
literacy amongst young people. Many have never (and possibly will have never) 
learned the technology of writing down their thoughts in a coherent or socially 
acceptable way. Martin’s (1998) Linguistics and the Consumer is an excellent 
indictment of the effects, real and potential, of the theory wars among literacy 
teachers, the public, and the state. I can add no more to what Martin has said on the 
matter. What I hope I have achieved here is to distinguish language (which is a socio-
biological phenomenon) from literacy (which is a communication technology), and 
brains from computers. The brain is not merely an information processor, although it 
can do calculations, and invent notions such as calculation, information, and 
processes. Nor is it even necessarily a single organ. It is certainly neither the sole 
source of cognition nor the controlling, ex machina engine of the body.  
If we wish to teach literacies, we must teach them to people, not brains. Thus, 
we must teach all relevant aspects of the technology. This is especially so since the 
preeminence of computers in the classroom. The hopeful enthusiasm for computers 
amongst some educators - and more particularly, the computer industry - may well be 
warranted, but their potential benefits will not and cannot be realised unless our 
children learn the communication technology upon which computers are founded: 
namely, print literacy. There are other social and political implication for seeing 
ourselves as mere reflections of our finest technologies, and these must always be 
considered. Because machines are more and less advanced, and therefore more and 
less valuable, a latent fascism lies in such understandings of ourselves, but these 
matters must be discussed elsewhere. 
At the risk of seeming theoretically profligate, I can only conclude that 
multiple approaches to literacy education are required, theories of the brain 
notwithstanding. The appropriateness of any particular approach will depend on the 
individuals being taught, and what they wish, or need, to achieve by their education. 
Doubtless, my conception of language will raise the ire of those committed to seeing 
language as a code, or as a technology in itself. So be it. In the end, one must ask: “a 
code for what?” and “a technology for whom?”. 
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